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School Choice, School Quality,  
and Postsecondary Attainment†
By David J. Deming, Justine S. Hastings, Thomas J. Kane,  
and Douglas O. Staiger*
We study the impact of a public school choice lottery in  Charlotte-
Mecklenburg schools on college enrollment and degree completion. 
We find a significant overall increase in college attainment among 
lottery winners who attend their first-choice school. Using rich 
administrative data on peers, teachers, course offerings, and other 
inputs, we show that the impacts of choice are strongly predicted by 
gains on several measures of school quality. Gains in attainment are 
concentrated among girls. Girls respond to attending a better school 
with higher grades and increases in  college-preparatory course 
taking, while boys do not. (JEL D44, H75, I21, I23, J16)
Today’s urban schools face increasing pressure to matriculate students who are 
ready for college. Growing returns to postsecondary education and shrinking mid-
dle-wage employment make college degree completion necessary for upward mobil-
ity into the American middle class (Goldin and Katz 2007; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 
2008). Improving the quality of high school education has become a first-order issue 
for economic growth, national competitiveness (US Department of Education 2006; 
Roderick, Nagaoka and Coca 2009), and equality of economic opportunity in light 
of the increasing wage returns to higher education (Acemoglu and Autor 2011). Yet 
there is little causal evidence on which policies can increase college attainment for 
students most in need (Murnane 2008).
In this article we study the impact of winning a lottery to attend a public high 
school in Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) on college enrollment and 
degree completion. CMS implemented an open enrollment public school choice 
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program in the fall of 2002, ending three decades of busing for racial integration 
and offering high school choice to students from all socioeconomic backgrounds. 
Students were guaranteed admission to their neighborhood school but were allowed 
to choose and rank up to three schools in the district, and slots to oversubscribed 
schools were assigned by lottery number. Students coming from low-performing 
high schools actively participated in the choice plan, often choosing substantially 
 higher-performing high schools over their neighborhood school option.
We use student-level administrative data from CMS linked to the National Student 
Clearinghouse (NSC), a national database of postsecondary enrollment which 
records college enrollment and degree completion for almost all colleges in the 
United States. We use assignment by random lottery numbers to chosen schools 
to identify the causal impact of attending a chosen school on secondary and post-
secondary educational attainment. Our approach is similar to prior research that 
uses school lotteries to estimate impacts on elementary and secondary achieve-
ment (Rouse 1998; Howell and Peterson 2002; Hoxby and Rockoff 2005; Cullen, 
Jacob, and Levitt 2006; Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2008; Wolf et al. 2008; Hoxby 
and Murarka 2009; Abdulkadiro ˘    glu et al. 2011; Dobbie and Fryer 2011; Hastings, 
Neilson, and Zimmerman 2012).
Overall we find small but statistically significant increases in high school gradu-
ation, postsecondary attendance, and degree completion for students who win the 
lottery to attend their first-choice school. We also find that the gains from school 
choice are almost entirely concentrated among girls. Girls who attend their first-
choice school are 14 percentage points more likely to complete a four-year college 
degree, yet we find no significant impacts for boys across a variety of measures of 
postsecondary attainment.
We then examine how the impact of choice varies with school characteristics. We 
construct a measure of college “value-added,” which estimates a school’s likelihood 
of sending students to college, conditional on prior characteristics. We show that 
lottery winners with the largest gains in school quality experience the largest gains 
in postsecondary attainment. This is possible because most students who did not get 
their first choice were assigned to their neighborhood school. Since the probability 
of winning the lottery is unrelated to neighborhood school assignment, and since it 
is a fixed characteristic at the time of application (like race or gender), we can com-
pare applicants who choose the same school but who have neighborhood schools of 
different quality.
Using rich administrative data on school and peer inputs, we show that  high-quality 
schools differ from low-quality schools along several dimensions. They have students 
with higher baseline math scores, a higher fraction of teachers with degrees from 
selective colleges, and a higher fraction of students completing  college-preparatory 
course requirements. While we do not have enough statistical power to separate the 
contribution of each of these variables, we do show that only girls appear to gain 
from attending higher-quality schools.
This suggests that girls are more responsive to gains in school quality—or alter-
natively, that a change in environment is more costly for boys. While boys and girls 
chose similar-quality schools on average and started at their new schools in simi-
lar courses with similar class rank, only girls remained “on track” throughout high 
school. By the end of high school, female lottery winners had higher grade point 
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 averages, had completed significantly more college-level coursework, and were 
more likely to take the SAT. Male lottery winners, on the other hand, dropped sig-
nificantly in class rank, showed no difference in college-level coursework, and were 
significantly more likely to fail an end-of-course exam in the upper grades. This pat-
tern of results mirrors the results in the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) Experiment 
(Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007), as well as many recent studies in school set-
tings (e.g., Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2006; Anderson 2008; Angrist, Lang, and 
Oreopoulos 2009; Angrist and Lavy 2009; Jackson 2010; Lavy and Schlosser 2011; 
Lavy, Silva, and Weinhardt 2011; Legewie and DiPrete 2012).
Taken together, the evidence suggests that girls responded to a more academically 
demanding environment with increased effort, while boys did not. This is consistent 
with prior work showing gender differences in study habits and time spent on home-
work (Jacob 2002; Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2006; Frenette and Zeman 2007). 
Girls might also be more responsive to increased school quality because of differ-
ences in the expected return to a college education (Charles and Luoh 2003; Goldin, 
Katz, and Kuziemko 2006; DiPrete and Buchmann 2006). Boys may respond to 
changes in social environment with maladaptive behavior, perhaps due to differences 
in coping behavior, peer norms, or differential response to relative rank within social 
group (e.g., Roderick 2003; Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2006; Niederle and Vesterlund 
2007; Barankay 2011). The bottom line is that the impacts we observe are the net 
effect of behavioral responses and adjustments by the students themselves, as well 
as their peers, teachers, and parents (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola 2011).
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of school choice 
on postsecondary attainment using a lottery-based research design.1 A series of 
recent papers use rule-based secondary school assignment to identify the impacts 
of school and/or peer quality for students at the margin of admission (Clark 2010; 
Jackson 2010; Pop-Eleches and Urquiola 2011; Abdulkadiro ˘    glu et al. 2011; Dobbie 
and Fryer 2011). Like the research design here, these papers share the limitation that 
they cannot unpack the impact of changing school assignment into changes in peer 
quality, teacher quality, or other important inputs. However, unlike the studies cited 
above, our research design enables us to observe impacts across the full range of 
prior academic preparation and relative rank. Attending a higher-quality school may 
have heterogeneous impacts in a high school setting, where course tracking and peer 
group identity are important features of the schooling experience.
We also build on an important literature in economics that studies the determi-
nants and impacts of school quality (e.g., Hanushek 1986; Card and Krueger 1992; 
Betts 1995; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005). Ultimately, we cannot rule out the 
importance of peer effects versus other inputs that can be directly manipulated by 
schools. However, we can show that school “value-added” measures, which con-
trol directly for observed differences in peer quality, also predict the impacts of 
school choice. More generally, we show convincing evidence that school choice 
1 Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) and Deming (2011) examine misbehavior and crime using high school lotter-
ies. Lavy (2010) and Booker et al. (2011) use difference-in-differences, instrumental variable, and regression dis-
continuity approaches to estimate the impact of public school choice on high school graduation. Fryer (2011) uses 
a differences-in-differences approach to estimate the impact of adopting charter school practices in low-performing 
public high schools on a variety of outcomes, including college attendance among students in twelfth grade at the 
beginning of the year.
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benefits applicants only when they gain access to higher-quality schools, however 
defined. Thus at least in this setting, there is no benefit of choice per se—rather, 
school choice is a mechanism through which students can gain access to higher-
quality schools. Finally, our finding of gender differences in responsiveness to school 
quality is an important potential explanation for the growing female advantage in 
completed schooling (Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko 2006; DiPrete and Buchmann 
2006; Bailey and Dynarski 2011).
I. Background
Charlotte-Mecklenburg is a large and diverse school district encompass-
ing Mecklenburg County, which includes both the inner city areas of Charlotte, 
North Carolina and its suburbs. In 1971, the Supreme Court (in Swann v. 
 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education) ruled that neighborhood segregation 
resulted in de facto segregated schools, and for over 30 years CMS schools bused 
students across the district to achieve racial desegregation. In 2001 this historic 
court order was overturned and the busing plan was terminated.
In December of 2001, the CMS School Board voted to move forward with 
 districtwide open enrollment for the 2002–2003 school year. In the spring of 2002, 
CMS asked parents to submit up to three choices for the upcoming school year for 
each child, listed in order of preference. CMS conducted an extensive information 
campaign to encourage parents to submit choice forms, including a comprehen-
sive booklet with information about each school (Hastings and Weinstein 2008). 
Importantly, they told parents that school choice forms were required to receive a 
school assignment in the subsequent year. This resulted in over 95 percent of parents 
submitting a choice application in the spring of 2002.
Each child received guaranteed access to his or her neighborhood school, which 
was usually (but not always) the closest to the child’s home address. Students were 
assigned to their neighborhood school by default, and admission for all other stu-
dents was subject to grade-specific capacity limits that were set by the district before-
hand but were not known to families at the time of the lottery (Hastings, Kane, and 
Staiger 2008). When demand for slots among nonguaranteed applicants exceeded 
supply, admission was allocated by lottery. Random lottery numbers were assigned 
within the following priority groups—(i) students who attended the school in the 
previous year and their siblings; (ii) free or reduced-price lunch–eligible (FRPL) 
students applying to schools where less than half of the previous year’s school popu-
lation was FRPL; (iii) students applying to a school within their own choice zone. 
In addition, siblings of currently enrolled children received guaranteed access. CMS 
was also divided into four “choice zones,” and free transportation was provided by 
the district, but only within each zone. Families could also provide their own trans-
portation to any school.2 The district expanded capacity at schools where it antici-
pated high demand in an attempt to give everyone his first choice. Still, many high 
schools were oversubscribed. Applicants were sorted by priority group  according to 
2 The choice zones were constructed so that there was at least one predominantly white suburban and at least 
one predominantly black inner-city school in each zone. In addition, free transportation was provided to several 
 “all-zone” magnets from any zone in the district.
995deming et al.: school choiceVol. 104 no. 3
these rules, and then assigned a random lottery number. Slots at each school were 
first filled by students with guaranteed access, and then remaining slots were allo-
cated within each priority group according to lottery numbers. If all members of a 
priority group could be offered admission, slots were allocated to the next group in 
the order of lottery numbers. CMS administered the lottery centrally and applied 
an algorithm known as a “first-choice maximizer” (Abdulkadiro ˘    glu and Sönmez 
2003). This meant that CMS first allocated slots to all those who listed a school as 
their first choice and only then moved to second choices. As the name indicates, this 
maximized the share of students who received their first choice. However, it also 
meant that students who lost the lottery to attend their first-choice school almost 
always found that their second choice had been filled up in the previous round. 
While there is the potential for strategic choice with this type of lottery mechanism, 
Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2008) show that this is not likely to have been a large 
problem in CMS, at least in the first year of the choice plan.
II. Data Description
We match the lottery applicant files to a panel of administrative data from CMS. 
The lottery applicant files contain individual choices, lottery numbers, priority 
groupings, and admissions outcomes. We supplement this with administrative data 
on all students from 1996 to 2009. These data contain detailed information on stu-
dent demographics, enrollment histories, test scores, and course-taking. We use data 
from the school years prior to the lottery to construct a set of pretreatment variables 
that can be used to test the validity of the randomization and to examine treatment 
effect heterogeneity. These pretreatment covariates include demographic informa-
tion such as gender, race, eligibility for free or reduced price lunch (an indicator of 
poverty), and students’ scores on standardized End-of-Grade (EOG) exams in math 
and reading up to grade eight. We also use prior address information to calculate 
median household income in a student’s neighborhood, and we assign students to 
“home” schools using high school neighborhood catchment areas.
The student records from CMS include linked individual-level information on 
college attendance from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC). The NSC is 
a nonprofit organization that maintains data on enrollment and graduation for stu-
dents at over 90 percent of colleges nationwide. In collaboration with CMS, we con-
structed a comprehensive list of students who had ever been enrolled in CMS and 
were old enough to have matriculated to college, regardless of the last grade they 
attended in CMS. CMS then provided this list to NSC for use in matching to post-
secondary records. Due to limited coverage of college experiences in the NSC, our 
main outcome variables are enrollment and degree receipt by college type—both 
two-year and four-year, as well as measures of college selectivity that are based on 
the 2009 Barron’s Profile of American Colleges.3
3 While all colleges in the NSC data report graduation, some do not report degree type. However, this can be 
inferred by the level of the school (i.e., four-year or two-year college). Information on major and degree is available 
for graduates of about 65 percent of the colleges covered by the NSC in our data (the share is 75 percent when col-
leges are weighted by the number of total enrollment spells in our data). The NSC data have no information about 
grades and collect data on choice of major only for a subset of graduates.
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Although not all colleges provide information to the NSC, the coverage is very 
good in North Carolina and the surrounding states. The online Appendix contains a 
list of colleges by coverage and a detailed analysis of the match process using data 
from the Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Data Source (IPEDS) 
as a reference. Critically, students who leave CMS are followed in the NSC data. 
While we cannot observe test scores or course taking for these students, we can 
measure their college attendance as long as they were ever enrolled in CMS. Thus, 
for postsecondary outcomes only, bias from nonrandom attrition is not a concern. 
Attrition is subject only to the NSC’s coverage and the quality of the match. Unless 
coverage is differential for lottery winners and losers, the results may be attenuated 
but not otherwise biased.
We also use CMS administrative data to examine impacts on high school gradua-
tion and a variety of school outcomes such as grades, exam scores, and college-level 
course taking. We use these data to measure students’ performance in and progress 
through courses that leave them “on track” to graduate with a college-preparatory 
diploma according to North Carolina standards, as well as participation in special 
programs such as AVID and ROTC.4 We further add information on yearly measures 
of school resources such as class size, books, and computers from the North Carolina 
Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI). Finally, we use CMS personnel files to 
construct school- and class-level measures of teacher and guidance counselor charac-
teristics such as years of experience, college quality, and licensing and certification.
III. Sample Characteristics and School Attributes
CMS received high school lottery applications from 29,584 high school students. 
We first limit the sample to students who were enrolled in any CMS school in the 
previous year. About 6 percent of applicants come from outside the district, and 
these students are much less likely to be enrolled in CMS the following fall. Since 
previous enrollment status is fixed at the time of the lottery, this sample restriction 
does not affect the validity of the randomization. We also exclude from the sample 
the small number of students who apply to special education programs. Finally, we 
exclude rising twelfth graders from the analysis sample because of concerns about 
correct randomization.5 This leaves an analysis sample of 20,021 students.
About 51 percent (10,302) of students in the sample listed their neighborhood 
school as their first choice. Since admission to neighborhood schools was guaranteed, 
there is no random variation in school attendance for this group. Of the remaining 
9,719 students, nearly half (4,736) applied to schools that were not  oversubscribed 
and, thus, were automatically admitted. Another one-third of students (3,118) were 
4 The formal math and science requirements for graduation in North Carolina include only Algebra I and 
Biology, yet a “college prep” course of study requires the completion of Geometry and Algebra II as well. The 
UNC system required students to complete an additional math course that has Algebra II as a prerequisite, and two 
credits in the same foreign language. For more information see: http://www.dpi.state.nc.us/docs/curriculum/home/
graduationrequirements.pdf.
5 We have analyzed the individual choice lotteries to confirm that random numbers determine offers of admission 
and have found that they hold perfectly except for in the twelfth grade. In reviewing the historical documentation 
and in conversation with CMS, we have some concern that additional slots may have been made available at schools 
for rising twelfth-grade applicants. Thus we exclude from the analysis the 85 rising twelfth-grade applicants who 
were in marginal priority groups (about 4 percent of the lottery sample).
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in priority groups where no one was admitted, leaving 1,865 students who applied to 
schools where admission was determined by random lottery. We use this sample for 
our analysis. Note that about 6 percent of this remaining sample does not show up 
in any CMS school in the fall of 2002. Although these students can still be matched 
to the NSC data and are included in the results for college attendance and degree 
completion, we have no other outcome information for them.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the overall analysis sample and the lottery 
subsample. Compared to the rest of the sample, lottery applicants are disproportion-
ately low income, African American, and had lower test scores and higher absences 
and out-of-school suspensions in eighth grade. Overall about 46 percent of students 
in the lottery sample are admitted to their first choice, compared to 83 percent of 
other students. Approximately 63 percent of the lottery sample is composed of rising 
ninth-graders, while 25 percent are rising tenth-graders and the remaining 12 per-
cent are rising eleventh-graders.6
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the 14 neighborhood and 3 magnet 
high schools in CMS. Schools vary widely in income, demographic composition, 
average student test scores, and postsecondary attainment. Median household 
income ranges from $89,089 (in 2000 dollars) in Providence to $32,744 in West 
Charlotte. Similarly, the share of minority (black or Hispanic) students ranges 
from 11 to 94 percent. Average eighth-grade math scores have a range of around 
1.3 student-level standard deviations.
Magnet high schools serve predominantly nonwhite students in the lower end of 
the income distribution. This is due in part to their location in the central city, whereas 
6 About 50 percent of rising ninth-grade students in the lottery sample are admitted, compared to 37 percent for 
tenth- and eleventh-graders. Less than 2 percent of rising ninth-grade students have missing test score information, 
compared to about 10 percent for tenth- and eleventh-graders combined. This is due to the fact that eighth-graders 
would have taken End of Grade exams in CMS, whereas ninth- and tenth-graders do not have to take a uniform 
exam. Other than differences in missing scores and in admission rates, sample characteristics are very similar for 
students across grade cohorts.
Table 1—Summary Statistics
Not lottery Lottery
Median household income $56,625 $46,465
Male 0.494 0.533
Black 0.410 0.614
Hispanic 0.035 0.044
Free/reduced-price lunch 0.424 0.633
Eighth-grade reading score (standardized) 0.036 −0.254
Eighth-grade math score (standardized) −0.009 −0.278
Missing reading and math scores 0.086 0.057
Eighth-grade days absent 9.020 10.890
Eighth-grade days out-of-school suspended 1.350 2.150
Distance to neighborhood school (miles) 4.320 4.540
Indicator if admitted to first choice 0.830 0.460
Sample size 18,156 1,865
Notes: Sample consists of rising ninth- to eleventh-grade students in the fall of 2002 who were 
also enrolled in CMS in the previous school year. Eighth-grade end-of-year (EOG) scores in 
math and reading are standardized at the state-year level. Median household income is calcu-
lated as the average value within each student’s 2000 census block group.
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many of the higher-income schools are located in the surrounding suburbs. Magnet 
schools rank near the district average on measures such as average test scores, high 
school graduation, and college attendance. Overall, applicants to magnet schools 
constitute 35 percent of the lottery sample. Column 4 shows the percent of students 
in each neighborhood school zone that are in the lottery sample. While students in 
the lottery sample are drawn disproportionately from inner city schools with high 
shares of minority students, there are many different neighborhood school-by-choice 
school combinations. Online Appendix Table 1 shows a matrix of counts of neigh-
borhood school-by-choice school combinations, separated by rising grade cohorts.
Column 5 of Table 2 shows the share of first-time rising ninth-grade students in 
each school who eventually enroll in a four-year college. Column 6 presents esti-
mates of college “value added,” constructed as the school average residual from a 
linear regression of four-year college attendance on a set of basic covariates from 
our main specifications, including a polynomial in prior math and reading scores.7 
7 We estimate  A ij = β X ij +  ν ij , where  ν ij =  μ j +  ε ij .  A ij is an indicator variable for whether a student ever 
attended a four-year college. The  X ij vector includes indicators for race, gender, free or reduced-price lunch, and 
third-order polynomials in state-standardized eighth-grade math and reading end-of-grade (EOG) exams. We pool 
Table 2—Descriptive Statistics by School
Median 
household 
income
Fraction 
black 
or 
Latino
Eighth- 
grade 
math 
score
Percent in 
lottery sample 
with this 
neighborhood 
school
Percent of 
freshmen 
attend 
four-year 
college
College 
“value 
added”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neighborhood schools
Myers Park 63,382 0.286 0.441 0.050 0.590 0.047
West Charlotte 32,744 0.939 −0.745 0.150 0.320 0.038
Providence 89,089 0.110 0.603 0.010 0.670 0.037
South Mecklenburg 67,177 0.203 0.331 0.070 0.540 0.018
East Mecklenburg 50,890 0.467 −0.044 0.130 0.470 0.014
Garinger 37,273 0.807 −0.662 0.170 0.290 0.003
Hopewell 67,998 0.288 0.001 0.040 0.530 −0.001
North Mecklenburg 66,861 0.256 0.255 0.030 0.540 −0.007
Independence 49,287 0.536 −0.106 0.080 0.430 −0.008
Butler 59,113 0.249 0.168 0.030 0.480 −0.009
Vance 52,514 0.630 −0.239 0.110 0.420 −0.039
Olympic 53,027 0.499 −0.180 0.130 0.370 −0.042
Waddell 43,901 0.660 −0.491 0.150 0.280 −0.056
West Mecklenburg 40,534 0.649 −0.504 0.160 0.240 −0.093
Magnet schools
Northwest Arts 52,654 0.388 −0.166 n/a 0.490 0.032
Harding University 43,643 0.678 0.089 n/a 0.530 0.007
Berry Academy 41,568 0.790 −0.223 n/a n/a n/a
Notes: The first 14 schools are neighborhood schools, listed in order of the college “value-added” measure in col-
umn 6. The last three schools are magnet schools with no assigned neighborhood zone. Column 1 shows median 
household income in the census tract where students in each school reside (based on the 2000 census). Eighth-grade 
math scores in column 3 are normalized at the state level. Column 4 shows the share of students from each neighbor-
hood zone that are in the lottery sample. Columns 5 and 6 are calculated based on student average characteristics in 
the fall 1998 and 1999 rising ninth-grade cohorts, to minimize the influence of the lottery sample. College “value 
added” in column 6 is estimated as the school average residual from a student-level regression of an indicator for 
four-year college enrollment on the set of covariates in equations (2) and (3), including student demographics and 
prior math and reading scores. See text for details.
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To minimize the mechanical influence of students in the lottery sample, we esti-
mate college “value added” using first-time ninth-grade students from fall 1998 and 
1999.8 The base rates of four-year college attendance also come from these two 
older grade cohorts.
College attendance rates range from 67 percent in Providence to 24 percent in 
West Mecklenburg, while college “value added” ranges from 0.047 to −0.093. If 
the college “value-added” estimates were unbiased after controlling for prior char-
acteristics, they could be interpreted as each school’s contribution to the chances 
that a randomly chosen student in the ninth-grade cohort will attend a four-year col-
lege. In that case, switching from West Mecklenburg to Providence would make a 
student 0.047 − (−0.093) = 14 percentage points more likely to attend a four-year 
college. We present the results in column 6 not as true unbiased measures of school 
quality, but to show that demographics are not a perfect predictor of college atten-
dance rates. For example, while West Charlotte has lower average income and lower 
eighth-grade math scores than West Mecklenburg, freshmen in West Charlotte are 
nonetheless about 8 percentage points more likely to attend a four-year college (0.32 
versus 0.24, column 5). This leads to the large disparity in college “value added” 
among the two schools. Later we will examine heterogeneity in the impact of choice 
by this and other measures of school quality.
IV. Empirical Strategy
We begin by following the standard approach in lottery-based studies of school 
choice, which estimate the average impact of winning the lottery across multiple 
schools and grades (Rouse 1998; Hoxby and Rockoff 2005; Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 
2006; Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2008; Hoxby and Murarka 2009; Abdulkadiro ˘    glu 
et al. 2011; Deming 2011; Hastings, Neilson, and Zimmerman 2012). We estimate
(1)   A i j = δ  W i j + β  X i j +  Γ j +  ε i j ,
where  W i j is an indicator variable that is equal to one if student i has a winning lot-
tery number for admission to school j,  A i j are academic outcomes of interest,  X i j is a 
vector of prelottery covariates that is included only for improved precision,  Γ j is a set 
of lottery fixed effects, and  ε i j is a stochastic error term.9 We use only first choices 
in the model, so the number of observations in the regression is simply equal to the 
number of students in the sample. In principle we could estimate a nested model that 
incorporates multiple choices and accounts for students’ “risk sets” (Abdulkadiro ˘   glu 
the ninth-grade cohorts of 1998 and 1999 and capture the school-level residual  μ j as our estimate of school “value 
added.”
8 Since the lottery sample comprises students from the 2000–2002 ninth-grade cohorts, there is no direct overlap 
in classrooms between lottery applicants and the students used to construct the “value-added” measure. The results 
are robust to using only one of the two years, and to using later grade cohorts with lottery applicants excluded from 
the calculation.
9 The lotteries were actually conducted at the school-grade-priority group level, so the number of lotteries is 
greater than the number of schools. We suppress subscripts for grade and priority group for notational convenience. 
The  X i j vector includes controls for median household income in the 2000 census block group, race, gender, free or 
reduced-price lunch, a third-order polynomial in eighth-grade math and reading test scores plus indicator variables 
for missing scores, indicators for the level of math taken in eighth grade (since some students are already enrolled 
in advanced math), and neighborhood (i.e., sending) school fixed effects.
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et al. 2011). However, since students who lost the lottery to attend their first-choice 
school were generally shut out of other oversubscribed schools, there is almost no 
randomization on second and third choices.
The β parameter from equation (1) gives the intent-to-treat (ITT) impact of win-
ning the lottery on student outcomes. In most specifications, we use the lottery 
assignment as an instrumental variable (IV) for enrollment in a student’s first-choice 
school in the fall of 2002. This results in the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
specification with enrollment  E i j as the endogenous variable in the first stage:
(2)   E i j = θ W i j + π  X i j +  Γ j +  ε i j 
(3)   A i j = δ   Ei j + β  X i j +  Γ j +  ω i j .
Since some students who lost the lottery still managed to enroll in their first choice, 
these estimates are local average treatment effects (LATEs) for students who com-
ply with their lottery status (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996). Lottery fixed effects 
Γ j are necessary to ensure that the ex ante probability of admission to a first-choice 
school does not differ between lottery winners and losers (Rouse 1998). In equa-
tion (3), δ gives the weighted average of outcome differences summed over each 
individual lottery, with weights equal to N ×  [ p(1 − p) ] where N is the number of 
applicants and p is the probability of admission (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2006).
We can test the validity of the randomization by replacing the outcomes  A i j in 
equation (3) with predetermined covariates such as race, gender, and prior test 
scores. If the randomization was conducted correctly, winners and losers should be 
balanced on all characteristics that are fixed at the time of the lottery. We test this 
in online Appendix Table 2 and find no statistically significant differences between 
lottery winners and losers along predetermined covariates.
V. Results
A. Main Results
Table 3 examines the impact of attending a first-choice school on postsecondary 
outcomes including college enrollment and degree completion. Each row contains 
an estimate of the 2SLS model in equations (2) and (3), where the lottery is used as 
an instrument for enrollment. Standard errors appear below each estimate in brack-
ets. They are clustered at the individual lottery level. Column 1 shows results for the 
full sample. Overall, we find small positive impacts of winning the lottery on four-
year college enrollment and degree completion. However, we find statistically sig-
nificant increases in enrollment and degree completion of about 4 percentage points 
in colleges that are classified by the 2009 Barron’s Profile of American Colleges as 
“very competitive” or higher, which we refer to here as “selective” colleges.10 These 
are large proportional impacts, about 40 and 60 percent increases from the control 
10 Schools in North Carolina with a rating of “very competitive” or higher include Appalachian State 
University, Duke University, Elon University, North Carolina State University, UNC-Asheville, UNC- Chapel Hill, 
 UNC-Wilmington, and Wake Forest University.
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mean baselines of 11 percentage points for attendance and 7 percentage points for 
degree completion.11
The last row of Table 3 presents results from a summary index that combines 
information across all attainment outcomes (O’Brien 1984; Kling, Liebman, and 
Katz 2007; Anderson 2008; Deming 2009).12 In addition to the outcomes listed in 
Table 3, the summary index also includes enrollment and degree completion in any 
postsecondary institution (including two-year colleges) and in “most competitive” 
colleges, the most selective category according to the Barron’s rankings.13 To create 
the index, we first normalize each outcome to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. We then create a single summary index variable that averages across 
outcomes and weights by the inverse of the sample covariance matrix to account for 
dependence across outcomes (O’Brien 1984). In the last row of  column 1, we see 
11 Since some enrollment and degree outcomes are relatively rare, we explore the sensitivity of our results to 
a nonlinear logit specification in online Appendix Table 4. In general, the results and their statistical significance 
(overall and for the subgroups in Table 5 when applicable) hold up to nonlinear specifications such as logit and 
probit (not shown).
12 We thank the editor for this suggestion.
13 Schools in North Carolina with a rating of “most competitive” or higher include only Davidson, Duke, 
UNC-Chapel Hill, and Wake Forest. The additional outcomes are listed in online Appendix Table 3.
Table 3—Impacts on Educational Attainment
Gender
Neighborhood 
school quality
Low-quality 
neighborhood schools
All Male Female High Low Male Female
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ever attended:
 Any four-year college 0.018 −0.091 0.169* −0.031 0.081 −0.038 0.220*
[0.058] [0.056] [0.076] [0.065] [0.077] [0.073] [0.110]
 Selective four-year college 0.042* 0.007 0.084 0.040 0.042 0.040 0.052
[0.019] [0.024] [0.045] [0.026] [0.032] [0.049] [0.040]
Earned a degree from:
 Any four-year college 0.047 −0.013 0.139* −0.030 0.149** 0.106 0.226*
[0.049] [0.043] [0.070] [0.057] [0.055] [0.062] [0.095]
 Selective four-year college 0.040* 0.004 0.089* 0.026 0.057** 0.036 0.096*
[0.017] [0.014] [0.046] [0.023] [0.026] [0.025] [0.047]
Attainment index 0.078* −0.009 0.193** −0.028 0.182** 0.100 0.288**
[0.034] [0.043] [0.070] [0.044] [0.070] [0.078] [0.111]
Sample size 1,865 994 871 1,070 795 416 379
Notes: Each estimate reports the local average treatment effect (LATE) of attending a first-choice school, using 
enrollment in fall 2002 as the endogenous variable in the first stage of the 2SLS system in equations (2) and (3). 
Standard errors are below each estimate in brackets and clustered at the lottery (school-grade-priority group) level. 
In columns 2 through 7, indicators for winning the lottery are interacted with the subgroup categories as instru-
ments, and each set of subgroups (i.e., gender, gender and school quality) is mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive. “Low-quality” neighborhood schools are the four lowest ranked schools on the college “value-added” 
measure listed in Table 2—all others are defined as “high quality.” The attainment index in the last row is a sum-
mary measure of all the outcomes above plus enrollment and degree completion in any college (including two-year 
and “most competitive” colleges), and is weighted to account for dependence across outcomes as described in the 
text. Measures of college quality are calculated using the 2009 Barron’s Profile of American Colleges—see text 
for details.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 * Significant at the 5 percent level.
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that lottery winners score 0.078 standard deviations higher on the attainment index, 
and the impact is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
In columns 2 and 3 we examine gender heterogeneity in the impact of winning 
the lottery. The results are from a single estimate of equations (2) and (3) with a full 
set of interactions between winning the lottery and indicator variables for whether a 
student is male or female. There are large and statistically significant differences in 
impacts on four-year college attendance for girls versus boys. Girls who attend their 
first-choice school are almost 17 percentage points more likely to attend a four-year 
college and 8 percentage points more likely to attend a very competitive college. 
In contrast, boys are actually 9 percentage points less likely (but not significant) to 
attend a four-year college and no more likely to attend a very competitive college. 
Turning to degree completion, girls are 14 and 9 percentage points more likely to 
complete a degree at a four-year college and a very competitive college respectively, 
with no significant impact for boys.14 Overall, we find an increase in postsecondary 
attainment of about 0.19 standard deviations for girls, with zero impact for boys, 
and the gender differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This 
matches the growing body of evidence that girls benefit academically more than boys 
from educational interventions (e.g., Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2006; Anderson 
2008; Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos 2009; Angrist and Lavy 2009; Deming 2009; 
Jackson 2010; Lavy and Schlosser 2011; Lavy, Silva, and Weinhardt 2011; Legewie 
and DiPrete 2012).15
Finally, we examine heterogeneity by neighborhood (i.e., sending) school. 
Because every student who applies to the same school (within a given priority 
group) has the same ex ante chance of admission, an applicant’s neighborhood 
school is a valid covariate on which to split the sample, similar to race or prior test 
scores. This setup allows us to compare treatment effects for students who applied to 
the same school, but who had outside options of different quality, generating varia-
tion in school quality gains within lottery. We divide schools into two groups based 
on their college “value added.” We advisedly label the four lowest-ranked schools 
on the college value-added measure as “low quality” and all other neighborhood 
schools as “high quality.” This dichotomization of schools is not sensitive to changes 
such as removing a particular school or including another.16 On average, students 
who win lotteries and come from low-quality neighborhood schools experience a 
5.3 percentage point increase in college value added, compared to a decline of 
14 Male lottery winners are somewhat more likely to attend and complete a degree at a two-year college, although 
the impact is not statistically significant. We do find marginally significant increases in “most competitive” college 
enrollment among boys, although the total number of attendees is very small. Part of the large increase in four-year 
(not competitive) college attendance and degree completion is driven by greater female attendance at for-profit 
colleges, which have shown mixed results in terms of return on investment (e.g., Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012). 
The impacts are somewhat smaller (but still significant) when for-profit colleges are excluded. All these results are 
in online Appendix Table 4.
15 We also examine heterogeneous impacts by race, poverty, whether students’ eighth-grade math score is above 
or below the median in the sample, and rising grade cohort (ninth versus tenth or eleventh). While there are some 
differences in outcomes by student group, the summary index measures of attainment are never significantly dif-
ferent from each other, nor are they as large as the gender differences shown in Table 3. Those results are reported 
in online Appendix Table 5.
16 In online Appendix Table 6, we present results based on some alternative rules for grouping schools based on 
quality. In online Appendix Table 7, we allow the impact of winning the lottery to vary continuously with college 
“value added” by using college “value added” rather than enrollment as the endogenous variable in the 2SLS system 
in equations (2) and (3). None of these alternative procedures changes the substantive nature of our conclusions.
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1.5 percentage points among applicants with high-quality neighborhood schools. 
This difference in school quality “dosage” is statistically significant at less than the 
1 percent level.
Columns 4 and 5 show results separated by neighborhood school quality. 
Overall, neighborhood school quality is a strong predictor of the impact of choice 
on postsecondary attainment. We find large and statistically significant increases 
in high school graduation and college degree completion among applicants with 
low-quality neighborhood schools, but no significant impacts in the “high-quality” 
sample. An F-test of the joint hypothesis that the results on the attainment index 
are significantly different by neighborhood school quality yields a p-value of 0.019. 
In columns 6 and 7, we show separate results by gender, within the low-quality 
neighborhood school sample. These estimates come from a single regression speci-
fication with all four gender by school quality combinations. In the low-quality 
neighborhood school sample, we find positive (but imprecise) gains for boys and 
large, statistically significant gains in attainment for girls. Notably, the gender dif-
ference in impacts in the low-quality neighborhood school sample (0.10 SDs for 
boys, 0.29 SDs for girls) is very similar in size to the full sample (−0.01 SDs for 
boys, 0.19 SDs for girls).
Before proceeding, we address some potential concerns with the interpretation 
of above results. First, we have college attendance data from the NSC through 
the spring of 2011. This means that rising ninth-grade students who progress nor-
mally through high school would be able to attend a maximum of ten semesters 
(fall 2006 to spring 2011) of college. Thus, for rising ninth-grade students in 2002 
our outcome is completion of a degree within five years of high school gradu-
ation, with additional years available for tenth- and eleventh-graders. If lottery 
applicants are more likely to enroll and progress through college “on time” for 
their grade cohort, this limited window of data could upwardly bias our results for 
degree completion.
To address this concern, we examine the subset of students in our sample who 
appear to be persisting continuously in college through spring 2011. In online 
Appendix Table 8, we reconstruct our main outcomes in Table 3 under the assump-
tion that all lottery losers, but no lottery winners, who persist continuously eventu-
ally obtain a degree. With this very conservative assumption, we find a decline in the 
impact on four-year degree completion of only about 3.5 percentage points, and zero 
impact on degree completion at very competitive colleges. Moreover, results for 
the summary index of attainment are still positive and marginally significant. This 
suggests that the increase in degree completion among lottery winners is unlikely to 
decline very much with additional years of data.
A second concern with our interpretation is that neighborhood school quality is 
simply an indicator for other differences between students in the two samples. For 
example, students from low-quality neighborhood schools differ systematically by 
income and prior test scores, and those characteristics may drive the gains from 
choice. However, in online Appendix Table 9 we show that the greater impacts in 
the “low-quality” neighborhood school sample hold within splits across a wide vari-
ety of covariates, including race, poverty, and prior test scores. Following Angrist, 
Pathak, and Walters (2013), we implement a Oaxaca-Blinder-style decomposition, 
which shows that the difference in impacts by neighborhood school quality cannot 
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be attributed to differences in observed student characteristics.17 While we cannot 
fully rule out that lottery applicants differ across neighborhood schools along unob-
served dimensions in ways that are correlated with the impacts of choice, we find no 
evidence that differences in observed student characteristics are driving the differ-
ences in impacts by neighborhood school quality.
B. School Characteristics
We next investigate the extent to which school characteristics, including peers, 
may contribute to our findings. Table 4 reports the impact of attending one’s 
 first-choice school on peer and school characteristics, including summary index 
measures of peer quality and school resources (including teachers).18 It follows the 
same structure as Table 3. We report results for two measures of school quality that 
attempt to control for observed differences in peers—college “value added” (from 
Table 2), and a school-level measure of “on track” in ninth grade that controls for 
prior differences in academic preparation.19 We note that these residualized mea-
sures of school quality will not account for unobserved differences or nonlinearities 
in peer quality, such as a “critical mass” of able peers, which could lead directly to 
changes in course offerings, teacher quality and improved resources. Due to space 
constraints we present only a limited selection of school characteristics, with the full 
set of results available in online Appendix Table 11.
The combined results of Table 4 lead to two important conclusions. First, com-
paring columns 2 and 3 and columns 6 and 7, we find no evidence for gender dif-
ferences in measures of peer or school quality. Since boys and girls in the lottery 
sample apply to and attend similar schools and come from similar neighborhoods, 
the pattern of results must reflect gender differences in responsiveness to school 
or peer quality. Second, comparing columns 4 and 5, we find significant differ-
ences in both peer and school quality between applicants coming from low- ver-
sus  high-quality neighborhood schools. Since our quality measure is college  “value 
added” (seen here in the last row of Table 4), this amounts to observing that college 
“value added” is strongly correlated with a variety of measures of school quality.
In the first three rows of Table 4, we see that lottery winners from low-quality 
neighborhood schools who attend their first-choice school have peers that are sig-
nificantly stronger academically (e.g., 0.36 standard deviations higher eighth-grade 
math scores), but relatively similar in terms of demographics. Moving to school 
17 The results of this decomposition are in online Appendix Table 10, along with a more detailed description of 
the procedure.
18 Students in the lottery sample are excluded from the calculation of the peer quality measures to avoid a 
mechanical correlation with the outcome. Each index is normalized and weighted as described earlier in the text. 
The peer index contains measures of peers’ eighth-grade math and reading scores, days suspended from school, 
days absent, and prior EOC math coursework (some students take Algebra I in eighth grade). The resource/teacher 
index includes measures of class size in EOC courses, the ratio of books to students and students to computers, 
whether students’ EOC course teachers are first-year teachers, the selectivity of the colleges attended by EOC teach-
ers (very competitive, most competitive), guidance counselors per capita, and the selectivity of colleges attended 
by guidance counselors.
19 The college “value-added” measure is described in Section III. The “on track” measure is a summary index of 
the school-level residuals from regressions of the probability that a student is in Algebra I or higher and Biology or 
higher in ninth grade, controlling for a full set of covariates including prior test scores and EOC math placement. 
For both “on track” measures, we use the rising ninth grade cohorts of 1998 and 1999, several years prior to the 
lottery, in order to minimize reflection problems with the lottery sample (Manski 1993).
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characteristics, we see that they have significantly smaller classes in End-of-Course 
(EOC) subjects and are substantially more likely to have a teacher with a bachelor’s 
degree from a selective college. In contrast, lottery winners from high-quality neigh-
borhood schools experience no significant increases in observed measures of peer or 
school quality, with significant declines in resources in a few cases. Finally, we also 
find that lottery winners attend schools with a greater share of students who are “on 
track” in their math and science courses toward a college-preparatory diploma. This 
measure reflects a combination of (i) differences in the prior academic preparation 
of peers, and (ii) differences in the academic rigor of the school, holding peer quality 
Table 4—Impacts on School Characteristics
 
Gender
Neighborhood 
school quality
Low-quality  
neighborhood schools
All Male Female High Low Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Peer characteristics
 Percent Black/Hispanic 0.042 0.056 0.024 0.107 −0.044 −0.038 −0.050
[0.069] [0.071] [0.067] [0.077] [0.082] [0.082] [0.083]
 Peer math score— 0.168 0.151 0.189* 0.018 0.363** 0.368** 0.357**
  school [0.088] [0.091] [0.087] [0.085] [0.100] [0.104] [0.098]
 Peer index 0.540** 0.494* 0.601** 0.199 0.982** 0.991** 0.869**
[0.185] [0.200] [0.185] [0.189] [0.205] [0.206] [0.193]
School characteristics:
 Class size −0.600 −0.720 −0.440 −0.470 −0.830** −1.030* −0.600
[0.500] [0.500] [0.520] [0.770] [0.410] [0.440] [0.450]
 Percent first year 0.118 0.140 0.090 0.151* 0.078 0.092 0.060
  teachers [0.073] [0.070] [0.076] [0.076] [0.079] [0.074] [0.084]
 Teacher BA— −0.010 −0.025 0.009 −0.098** 0.095* 0.083 0.111*
  selective college [0.036] [0.036] [0.038] [0.030] [0.049] [0.047] [0.051]
 Resource/teacher index −0.140 −0.148 −0.131 −0.257 0.006 −0.004 0.021
[0.117] [0.111] [0.132] [0.158] [0.114] [0.110] [0.108]
College preparatory factors:
 Percent “on track” 0.115** 0.114** 0.116** 0.063* 0.177** 0.176** 0.178**
  in math [0.017] [0.014] [0.023] [0.019] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016]
 Residual “on-track” 0.545** 0.515* 0.585** 0.220 0.935** 0.985** 0.864**
  index [0.202] [0.207] [0.220] [0.199] [0.257] [0.265] [0.244]
 College “value added” 0.019 0.020 0.018 −0.015 0.053** 0.052** 0.059**
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011]
Sample size 1,865 994 871 1,070 795 416 379
Notes: Each estimate reports the local average treatment effect (LATE) of attending a first-choice school, using 
enrollment in fall 2002 as the endogenous variable in the first stage of the 2SLS system in equations (2) and (3). 
Standard errors are below each estimate in brackets and clustered at the lottery (school-grade-priority group) level. 
In columns 2 through 7, indicators for winning the lottery are interacted with the subgroup categories as instru-
ments, and each set of subgroups (i.e., gender, gender and school quality) is mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive. “Low-quality” neighborhood schools are the four lowest ranked schools on the college “value-added” 
measure listed in Table 2—all others are defined as “high quality.” The classroom and teacher measures are cal-
culated for students’ EOC math courses, which are required for graduation with a college-preparatory diploma. 
Measures of college quality are calculated using the 2009 Barron’s Profile of American Colleges—see text for 
details. Each index variable is a summary measure of all the relevant outcomes listed above it plus additional out-
comes listed in the text and in online Appendix Table A11, and they are weighted to account for dependence across 
outcomes as described in the text.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 * Significant at the 5 percent level.
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constant. While these mechanisms cannot be fully separated, we can show that lot-
tery winners from low-quality neighborhood schools attend schools where students 
are more likely to stay on track conditional on baseline test scores. For lottery win-
ners with low-quality neighborhood schools, the magnitude (0.93 standard devia-
tions on the residual “on-track” index, column 5) is very similar to the change in 
peer quality (0.98 SDs).
While the impacts on some measures appear larger than on others, this is difficult 
to interpret without information about the causal impact of each input on postsec-
ondary attainment. For example, even though the mean impact of choice on resource 
and teacher quality is not statistically significant, perhaps there are certain inputs 
(for example, teacher or guidance counselor college selectivity) that have a large 
influence on student outcomes, and thus should be weighted more heavily. Without 
a variety of experiments that carefully manipulate teachers, peers, and other school 
attributes, we cannot separately identify the impact of each input. Moreover, as 
Table 4 shows, they are highly collinear.
Still, the distinction between peers and inputs that can be affected directly by pol-
icy is particularly important. Jackson (2010) finds that direct peer quality accounts 
for only 10 percent of school “value added” overall, but one-third among highly 
selective schools. Similarly, recent work that identifies the impacts of attending a 
better school for students at the margin of admission using a regression discontinu-
ity (RD) design finds mixed results (Clark 2010; Jackson 2010; Pop-Eleches and 
Urquiola 2011; Abdulkadiro ˘   glu et al. 2011; Dobbie and Fryer 2011). In particular, 
Dobbie and Fryer (2011) find no impact of admission to selective exam schools 
in New York City on postsecondary outcomes, despite large gains in peer quality. 
Because these RD studies necessarily compare the highest-scoring students in a 
lower-ranked school to the lowest-scoring students in a higher-ranked school, they 
identify peer effects (and responses to resources and other school-level differences) 
at a particular margin. These impacts will not necessarily generalize to the range of 
applicants in a school choice lottery, particularly in high school when identity and 
peer sorting can generate unpredictable results (Akerlof and Kranton 2002; Carrell, 
Sacerdote, and West 2011; Cicala, Fryer, and Spenkuch 2011).
Our main results for attainment are broadly consistent with the gains we find on 
measures of peer quality. However, we also find that the impacts for lottery win-
ners are larger when they gain more resources and teacher quality (although the 
estimates are noisy), and when they gain more on school-level measures of college 
“value added” and keeping students “on track.” Importantly, these last two measures 
explicitly control for observed differences in peers across schools and may be prox-
ies for important school policies and practices that we do not observe. Nonetheless, 
the evidence on mechanisms is ultimately suggestive, particularly in an environment 
where students, peers, teachers, and parents may respond by adjusting their behavior 
or effort in a variety of ways (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola 2011).
One alternative approach, which we pursue in online Appendix Table 7, is to use 
various measures of school quality as first-stage endogenous variables. In principle, 
we could determine which measures of quality are most correlated with increased 
attainment, controlling for the others. However, while many of the measures are 
strong predictors independently, there is insufficient variation to identify mecha-
nisms when multiple measures are included.
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More important, however, any explanation of our results must account for gender 
differences in responsiveness to peer or school quality. We examine these in more 
detail in Table 5.
C. Mediating Outcomes in High School
Table 5 presents results for a broad range of academic outcomes in high school. 
Due to space constraints we present only a small selection of academic outcomes, 
with the full set of results available in online Appendix Table 12. The last row of 
Table 5 is a summary index of all mediating outcomes (constructed identically to the 
Table 5—Impacts on Mediating Outcomes
   
Gender
  Neighborhood school 
quality
  Low-quality  
neighborhood schools
All Male Female High Low Male Female
  (1)   (2) (3)   (4) (5)   (6) (7)
High school GPA 0.127* 0.043 0.239** 0.077 0.189 0.119 0.271*
[0.058] [0.079] [0.088] [0.058] [0.101] [0.117] [0.107]
GPA rank within −4.230 −6.440* −1.930 −6.490* −3.060 −4.510 −1.340
 school cohort [2.520] [3.160] [3.120] [2.740] [3.990] [4.350] [4.360]
Number EOC math 0.230** 0.084 0.424** 0.101 0.353** 0.200 0.534**
 courses [0.050] [0.069] [0.087] [0.069] [0.091] [0.127] [0.106]
AP calculus −0.004 −0.008 0.001 −0.031 0.031 0.026 0.037
[0.025] [0.035] [0.054] [0.029] [0.047] [0.039] [0.080]
“On track” in math, 0.116** 0.110* 0.124** 0.071 0.161* 0.147* 0.175*
 2002–2003 [0.040] [0.053] [0.035] [0.038] [0.063] [0.072] [0.068]
“On track” in math, 0.090* 0.038 0.158** 0.009 0.186** 0.091 0.256**
 2003–2004 [0.043] [0.043] [0.053] [0.055] [0.063] [0.073] [0.071]
Ever failed an EOC 0.051 0.093* −0.005 0.073 0.040 0.034 0.022
 math course [0.031] [0.039] [0.034] [0.046] [0.040] [0.066] [0.053]
SAT score −3.570 4.780 −13.190 −26.750 5.480 5.180 3.890
[14.850] [21.830] [18.170] [26.840] [17.810] [27.760] [18.740]
Took the SAT 0.036 −0.070 0.177** −0.048 0.124* 0.013 0.254**
[0.028] [0.052] [0.060] [0.050] [0.063] [0.080] [0.096]
Graduated from 0.055 0.031 0.082 −0.022 0.138** 0.121 0.142
 CMS [0.032] [0.039] [0.065] [0.053] [0.055] [0.077] [0.075]
Mediator index 0.056* −0.004 0.135** −0.006 0.121** 0.069 0.229**
[0.021] [0.037] [0.047] [0.033] [0.037] [0.048] [0.056]
Sample size 1,865 994 871 1,070 795 416 379
Notes: The sample size listed is for the mediator summary index—sample sizes for individual outcomes vary. Each 
estimate reports the local average treatment effect (LATE) of attending a first-choice school, using enrollment in 
fall 2002 as the endogenous variable in the first stage of the 2SLS system in equations (2) and (3). Standard errors 
are below each estimate in brackets and clustered at the lottery (school-grade-priority group) level. In columns 2 
through 7, indicators for winning the lottery are interacted with the subgroup categories as instruments, and each 
set of subgroups (i.e., gender, gender and school quality) is mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. “Low-
quality” neighborhood schools are the four lowest ranked schools on the college “value-added” measure listed in 
Table 2—all others are defined as “high quality.” EOC math are state standardized courses in Algebra I, Geometry, 
and Algebra II and are required for graduation with a college-preparatory diploma. The mediator index in the last 
row is a summary measure of all the outcomes above it plus the outcomes listed in Appendix Table A12 and is 
weighted to account for dependence across outcomes as described in the text.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 * Significant at the 5 percent level.
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summary indices in Tables 3 and 4), including those not presented in the table. In 
reading this table it is important to remember that we do not observe high school out-
comes (as opposed to college outcomes) for students who leave CMS.20 However, 
high school outcomes may uncover important intermediate changes in student’s 
achievement and experiences, pointing to potential mechanisms that underlie our 
main results.
Lottery winners who attend their first-choice schools have higher cumulative 
grade point averages, complete more total EOC math courses, and are more likely 
to stay “on track” towards completing college preparatory math requirements.21 
We find no increases in advanced placement (AP) math course-taking, nor do we 
find evidence of increased enrollment in advanced math or science classes such as 
 precalculus, statistics, or physics (results for these subjects and many others, includ-
ing extracurricular programs, are included in online Appendix Table 13). In the last 
row of column 1, we find an overall increase of about 0.06 standard deviations on 
a summary index of all mediating outcomes. In columns 2 and 3, we see that, like 
postsecondary attainment, these overall gains are driven entirely by girls. The pat-
tern of impacts by gender and school quality for the main results in Table 3 also 
holds here, with small and imprecise gains for boys but large gains for girls from 
“low-quality” neighborhood schools.
We find no impact on the SAT scores overall or in any of the subsamples in 
Table 4. Yet we do find large and statistically significant increases in SAT exam-
taking among girls, especially girls in the low-quality neighborhood school sample. 
This pattern of imprecise impacts on scores but increases in taking the exam and 
“on-track” course-taking also holds across all of the EOC math and science subjects. 
Lottery winners who attend their first-choice school are more likely to graduate 
from a CMS high school, with a larger point estimate among girls, though coming 
from a low-quality school appears to be the driving factor for this outcome.
Overall, the pattern of impacts for mediating outcomes closely matches the main 
results in Table 3. The Mediator Index in the final row tells a clear story of girls 
responding positively to their new academic environment, suggesting that the gen-
der differences we find in our main results are reflected in gender differences in high 
school experiences.
VI. Explaining Gender Differences in Responsiveness to School Quality
We consider three broad explanations for gender differences in responsiveness 
to school quality. First, the girls may differ from the boys in the lottery sample in 
terms of prior academic preparation or other characteristics. However, we find no 
20 In online Appendix Table 13 we show that lottery winners are 2 percentage points more likely to enroll in CMS 
in the fall after choice, and approximately 5 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in CMS by spring 2004. 
We investigate the sensitivity of these results to a wide variety of assumptions about differential attrition in online 
Appendix Table 14. In general, imputation of missing scores and course-taking variables leaves the results substan-
tively unchanged. Bounding exercises for exam and course-taking results generally fail to diminish the statistical 
significance of those findings. However, bounding exercises for EOC test score or SAT impacts lead to confidence 
intervals that are too wide to draw any firm conclusions.
21 EOC math courses are Algebra I, Geometry, and Algebra II, with state-standardized exams at the end of 
course. “On Track” is defined as taking Algebra I by ninth grade, Geometry by tenth grade and Algebra II by elev-
enth grade, given that the North Carolina requirements for a college-preparatory diploma are the three EOC courses 
plus one additional more advanced course (four total).
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evidence of gender differences in pretreatment covariates such as income and prior 
test scores. Girls and boys in the lottery sample have nearly identical eighth-grade 
test scores, and we find no difference in covariates by gender within choice lotteries. 
Moreover, girls and boys are balanced across neighborhoods and choice schools, 
and an analysis of individual lotteries reveals that the treatment effect for girls is 
greater in nearly every case. Thus we conclude that the pattern of impacts by gender 
is not a function of other observed characteristics.
Second, girls may respond to new environments and peer groups in ways that 
are more conducive to academic achievement. Several recent studies in school set-
tings have found greater impacts for girls (e.g., Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2006; 
Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007; Anderson 2008; Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos 
2009; Angrist and Lavy 2009; Jackson 2010). Qualitative work on gender differ-
ences in the Chicago public schools and in the Moving to Opportunity housing 
mobility experiment found important gender differences in coping mechanisms and 
responses to the stress of a new environment, perhaps because of an absence of 
same-sex role models in the home or in school, and greater conflict with the norms 
of an academic or culturally dominant environment (Roderick 2003, Clampet-
Lundquist et al. 2006).
A related possibility is that boys respond less productively to increased competi-
tion from peers. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that while males are more 
likely to seek out tournament competition conditional on ability, they also overes-
timate their performance rank within a group. Interestingly, Barankay (2011) finds 
that when employees are privately informed about their performance rank within a 
group, males respond more negatively to declines in relative ranking. The results 
in Table 5 show that female lottery winners have higher GPAs, while boys do not. 
However, GPAs are higher on average in higher quality schools. We find that the 
GPA improvements for female lottery winners place them at the same class rank 
as girls who lose the lottery (second row of Table 5, columns 2 and 3). However, 
the insignificant results for boys’ GPA lead to a statistically significant decline of 
about 6.5 percentile ranks within grade cohort. This evidence is consistent with 
boys responding negatively (or less positively) to increased competition in a new 
school environment. This pattern holds as well for the summary index of mediat-
ing outcomes—female lottery winners and losers perform at about the median for 
their school, but lottery winners attend schools where students have better grades 
and more difficult coursework. On the other hand, male lottery winners typically 
rank lower in the distribution of grades and course rigor when they attend their first-
choice school.
Third, girls may increase effort more than boys in response to a more academi-
cally demanding environment. While boys and girls are equally likely to be “on 
track” in math at the end of the first school year after choice, by the end of the sec-
ond year only girls are still more likely to be “on track” for a college-preparatory 
diploma (rows four and five of Table 5). In row six of Table 5, we see that this is 
likely due to a statistically significant increase in the probability that male lottery 
winners (especially in the “high-quality” neighborhood school sample) will fail an 
EOC math course at some point during high school. The lack of any initial gender 
difference in the probability of being “on track” suggests that while boys and girls 
are initially assigned to similar classes, boys are more likely to struggle. Several 
1010 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 2014
studies have found that conditional on academic ability, girls spend more time on 
homework and have better study habits (Jacob 2002; Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 
2006; Frenette and Zeman 2007). Girls might work harder in higher-quality schools 
because they have higher expected returns to a college education (Charles and Luoh 
2003; Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko 2006; DiPrete and Buchmann 2006). Increased 
effort could also be a response to gender differences in peer group pressure (Akerlof 
and Kranton 2002, Clampet-Lunquist et al. 2006).
VII. Discussion and Conclusion
In this article we study the impact of winning an admissions lottery to attend 
a public high school in Charlotte-Mecklenburg on college enrollment and degree 
completion. We find increases in postsecondary attainment that are concentrated 
among girls and students from low-quality neighborhood schools. We show that the 
benefits of choice are greater for lottery applicants who experience larger gains in 
school quality, although we are unable to separately disentangle mechanisms such 
as peer effects, resources, and teachers that may be at play.
This finding is important in light of the growing returns to postsecondary edu-
cation and increasing inequality of opportunity by race and income in the United 
States (Duncan and Murnane 2011). Our findings imply that school choice can lead 
to long-run gains in educational attainment, but only when applicants gain access 
to higher-quality schools. Our results also show that high school quality exerts an 
important influence on some students’ life chances, suggesting that later life inter-
ventions may have a high social return on investment, provided that we can uncover 
the correct mechanisms (e.g., Heckman 2006).
Finally, we find that girls are more responsive than boys to gains in school quality. 
While ultimately we can only speculate about the reasons, we note that the results 
are consistent with growing evidence on the reverse gender gap in achievement 
when low-income children are moved into a more academically competitive envi-
ronment (Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko 2006; Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2006; 
Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007; Bailey and Dynarski 2011). Uncovering the under-
lying reasons for gender differences in responsiveness to an improved environment 
remains an important issue for explaining the growing female advantage in com-
pleted schooling.
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